Containing China?
A number of commentators, most but not all tied to the right wing of the US foreign policy establishment, have recently called for a more agressive attitude towards China. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has expressed concern about China's rising military budget, specially as concerns its Navy.
This is all well and fine, and I certainly have no illusions about the benevolence of the Chinese government, but as a prescription for policy, this is mostly useless. Why? Read on...
No one can accuse the Bush administration of a bashful approach to foreign policy, or of being afraid of wielding the big stick. Prior to the 2000 elections, the Bush electoral platform, while isolationist in tone, made no bones about confronting China. Most of the China hawks ascribe the administration's current gingerly policy towards China to its help in the War on Terror. That ignores the Bush administration's behavior during the Hainan spy plane crisis of April 2001, well before September 11. The administration adopted a measured, arguably even timid response to assertive Chinese military gestures.
Why was this so? Knee-jerk liberals who believe this administration is in thrall to Big Business have a ready-made explanation: American corporations salivating over prospects on the Chinese market somehow pressured the President towards a more conciliatory attitude. This is of course simplistic. Contrary to popular belief, the oil industry was mostly opposed to the Iraq war, fearful of destabilization in the Middle East. Correctly as it turns out. No matter what you may think about the industry, it is certainly not headed by theoricians confusing vision with wishful thinking.
What other explanation is there? Unless Bob Woodward gets on the case, we will be in the dark for quite a few years to come as to the exact reasons, but my guess is that George W. Bush, who entered office with a very sketchy understanding of foreign affairs, had to undergo a crash course with Condoleeza Rice, realized he did not have any palatable options, and that the Chinese would call his bluff if he attempted to bluster his way out. Rice is an expert on cold-war foreign relations - however badly she may have miscalculated on other areas, she is well prepared to analyze the face-off with China.
China's position grows stronger with time as its economy races forward and its armed forces modernize. If the US could not or dared not confront China in April 2001, it certainly cannot today, or in the conceivable future.
Much is said of the rise of China, and that the 21st century will be China's. The Chinese believe, with some justification, that it is not so much a "rise" as the return of China to its rightful position throughout most of human history as the world's most important nation. Madeleine Albright famously rejoiced in the US' status as "the central nation, the indispensable nation". The Chinese's own name for China can be translated as "the central realm"...
Military power is constrained by economic, demographic and industrial power. These are the factors that made the US the dominant world power in potential, if not actual exercise, in 1900. These factors are also at work for China. Once China reaches GDP parity with the US (it is absolute numbers that matter here), it will actually be at a military advantage over the US, as it will still have much lower personnel costs than the US (GNP per capita would still be a fourth of the US'), and probably a higher level of tolerance for casualties, leading to a much more cost-effective army, yuan-for-yuan, dollar-for-dollar.
China is already manufacturing highly advanced electronics for the entire world, and the perceived technological supremacy of the US could probably be countered more rapidly than is commonly thought. Stockpiles of equipment accumulated today will be obsolete in 20 or 50 years, when (not if) China feels strong enough to push the US out of East Asia, the way the Japanese pushed the British out. The Europeans' proposed lifting of their arms embargo on China is telling. The US has repeatedly spurned them on any of the issues that concern them, whether it is global warming, the International Criminal Court, the Middle Eastern conflict, Iraq or human rights abuses at Guantanamo and elsewhere. No amount of wallpapering over the cracks in the transatlantic relationship can obscure the fact they clearly do not care any more if weapons they sell to China may one day be used against American servicemen.
What do the pundits mean when they advocate confronting China? You will note their prescriptions are notably lacking in specifics.
The military option is unthinkable - China is a nuclear power, the US cannot attack it directly. Nothing short of Taiwan acquiring nuclear weapons can really deter the Chinese leadership. They will calculate that in the event of a war over Taiwan, the US and Japan will ultimately bend rather than face catastrophic losses to their military forces. In war, will and commitment is often the key for victory, as the Chinese showed during the Korean War.
Economic warfare seems an attractive proposition, as that would sap the foundations of resurgent Chinese power. As the Chinese's biggest customer, the US has some leverage, but this is countered by the amount of US debt the Chinese hold, and in any case the Chinese economy is poised to reach critical mass where it can sustain high growth from internal demand alone, much as the US did during the 19th century. The US is isolated diplomatically due to the rash policies of the first Bush term, and would not be able to get any of its allies to join in sanctions against the Chinese. Any such attempt would likely damage the US economy more than the Chinese, and thus actually accelerate the day of reckoning.
Diplomatic isolation is the remaining alternative, and clearly the one currently sought. Most of the smaller ASEAN nations seem to have made their choice of neutrality, or even allegiance to China. The only possible US allies in such an endeavor are Japan, India, South Korea and Taiwan itself. Korea is not a reliable ally in this respect, as the prospect of reunification could probably bring them over to neutrality: the US' support for the brutal military dictatorship in South Korea until the 80s (Kwangju uprising: 2000 civilian dead) has certainly led to little love lost in the general population there. India is not keen to lock horns with China for for the US' sake, and sensibly prefers to watch from the sidelines as the US and China weaken one another. Japan is probably the one ally the US has, and may even go nuclear out of fear of China, but it is hard to imagine it sticking its neck out that far to defend Taiwan - it will probably prefer to fortify itself much as the Taiwanese themselves have done for the last sixty years.
In any case two can play that game. The Chinese are increasingly active in South America, specially Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina. Unless dramatic breakthroughs are made in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the US is also terribly exposed in the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia due to the unprecedented level of hostility it has aroused in the Muslim world. This is compounded by the administration's willful refusal to even consider taking measures to reduce the nation's dependence on oil, like developing nuclear power on a massive scale (as the Chinese are doing, incidentally), rebuilding the railroads, imposing mandatory fuel efficiency standards or a gasoline tax.
No matter how you look at it, the US does not have many realistic options to "confront" or even really contain China. The dominance of China is not a given. Remember, in the 50s, Nikita Khrushchev's Soviet Union posted equally impressive (and bogus) growth figures, leading him to boast he would bury us. China still faces immense challenges and could still blow it. But its future is in its own hands, not in the US' or any other country's. In this coming century, we will live through interesting times.
P.S. Read also Berkeley economics professor Brad DeLong's excellent article on how to avoid framing the relationship with China as a zero-sum game.
This is all well and fine, and I certainly have no illusions about the benevolence of the Chinese government, but as a prescription for policy, this is mostly useless. Why? Read on...
No one can accuse the Bush administration of a bashful approach to foreign policy, or of being afraid of wielding the big stick. Prior to the 2000 elections, the Bush electoral platform, while isolationist in tone, made no bones about confronting China. Most of the China hawks ascribe the administration's current gingerly policy towards China to its help in the War on Terror. That ignores the Bush administration's behavior during the Hainan spy plane crisis of April 2001, well before September 11. The administration adopted a measured, arguably even timid response to assertive Chinese military gestures.
Why was this so? Knee-jerk liberals who believe this administration is in thrall to Big Business have a ready-made explanation: American corporations salivating over prospects on the Chinese market somehow pressured the President towards a more conciliatory attitude. This is of course simplistic. Contrary to popular belief, the oil industry was mostly opposed to the Iraq war, fearful of destabilization in the Middle East. Correctly as it turns out. No matter what you may think about the industry, it is certainly not headed by theoricians confusing vision with wishful thinking.
What other explanation is there? Unless Bob Woodward gets on the case, we will be in the dark for quite a few years to come as to the exact reasons, but my guess is that George W. Bush, who entered office with a very sketchy understanding of foreign affairs, had to undergo a crash course with Condoleeza Rice, realized he did not have any palatable options, and that the Chinese would call his bluff if he attempted to bluster his way out. Rice is an expert on cold-war foreign relations - however badly she may have miscalculated on other areas, she is well prepared to analyze the face-off with China.
China's position grows stronger with time as its economy races forward and its armed forces modernize. If the US could not or dared not confront China in April 2001, it certainly cannot today, or in the conceivable future.
Much is said of the rise of China, and that the 21st century will be China's. The Chinese believe, with some justification, that it is not so much a "rise" as the return of China to its rightful position throughout most of human history as the world's most important nation. Madeleine Albright famously rejoiced in the US' status as "the central nation, the indispensable nation". The Chinese's own name for China can be translated as "the central realm"...
Military power is constrained by economic, demographic and industrial power. These are the factors that made the US the dominant world power in potential, if not actual exercise, in 1900. These factors are also at work for China. Once China reaches GDP parity with the US (it is absolute numbers that matter here), it will actually be at a military advantage over the US, as it will still have much lower personnel costs than the US (GNP per capita would still be a fourth of the US'), and probably a higher level of tolerance for casualties, leading to a much more cost-effective army, yuan-for-yuan, dollar-for-dollar.
China is already manufacturing highly advanced electronics for the entire world, and the perceived technological supremacy of the US could probably be countered more rapidly than is commonly thought. Stockpiles of equipment accumulated today will be obsolete in 20 or 50 years, when (not if) China feels strong enough to push the US out of East Asia, the way the Japanese pushed the British out. The Europeans' proposed lifting of their arms embargo on China is telling. The US has repeatedly spurned them on any of the issues that concern them, whether it is global warming, the International Criminal Court, the Middle Eastern conflict, Iraq or human rights abuses at Guantanamo and elsewhere. No amount of wallpapering over the cracks in the transatlantic relationship can obscure the fact they clearly do not care any more if weapons they sell to China may one day be used against American servicemen.
What do the pundits mean when they advocate confronting China? You will note their prescriptions are notably lacking in specifics.
The military option is unthinkable - China is a nuclear power, the US cannot attack it directly. Nothing short of Taiwan acquiring nuclear weapons can really deter the Chinese leadership. They will calculate that in the event of a war over Taiwan, the US and Japan will ultimately bend rather than face catastrophic losses to their military forces. In war, will and commitment is often the key for victory, as the Chinese showed during the Korean War.
Economic warfare seems an attractive proposition, as that would sap the foundations of resurgent Chinese power. As the Chinese's biggest customer, the US has some leverage, but this is countered by the amount of US debt the Chinese hold, and in any case the Chinese economy is poised to reach critical mass where it can sustain high growth from internal demand alone, much as the US did during the 19th century. The US is isolated diplomatically due to the rash policies of the first Bush term, and would not be able to get any of its allies to join in sanctions against the Chinese. Any such attempt would likely damage the US economy more than the Chinese, and thus actually accelerate the day of reckoning.
Diplomatic isolation is the remaining alternative, and clearly the one currently sought. Most of the smaller ASEAN nations seem to have made their choice of neutrality, or even allegiance to China. The only possible US allies in such an endeavor are Japan, India, South Korea and Taiwan itself. Korea is not a reliable ally in this respect, as the prospect of reunification could probably bring them over to neutrality: the US' support for the brutal military dictatorship in South Korea until the 80s (Kwangju uprising: 2000 civilian dead) has certainly led to little love lost in the general population there. India is not keen to lock horns with China for for the US' sake, and sensibly prefers to watch from the sidelines as the US and China weaken one another. Japan is probably the one ally the US has, and may even go nuclear out of fear of China, but it is hard to imagine it sticking its neck out that far to defend Taiwan - it will probably prefer to fortify itself much as the Taiwanese themselves have done for the last sixty years.
In any case two can play that game. The Chinese are increasingly active in South America, specially Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina. Unless dramatic breakthroughs are made in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the US is also terribly exposed in the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia due to the unprecedented level of hostility it has aroused in the Muslim world. This is compounded by the administration's willful refusal to even consider taking measures to reduce the nation's dependence on oil, like developing nuclear power on a massive scale (as the Chinese are doing, incidentally), rebuilding the railroads, imposing mandatory fuel efficiency standards or a gasoline tax.
No matter how you look at it, the US does not have many realistic options to "confront" or even really contain China. The dominance of China is not a given. Remember, in the 50s, Nikita Khrushchev's Soviet Union posted equally impressive (and bogus) growth figures, leading him to boast he would bury us. China still faces immense challenges and could still blow it. But its future is in its own hands, not in the US' or any other country's. In this coming century, we will live through interesting times.
P.S. Read also Berkeley economics professor Brad DeLong's excellent article on how to avoid framing the relationship with China as a zero-sum game.
posted by Fazal Majid at 9:30 PM
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